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IF I HAD A HAMMER: THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AS ANOTHER TOOL
TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS RIGHTS TO LAND
Heather Bowman†
Abstract: As developing countries embrace market economies, a primary source of
investment is in the form of foreign direct investment through action by Multinational
Enterprises (“Multinationals”) inside a country’s borders. Activity by a Multinational is
often regulated only by the host country, which may place minimal restrictions on it for
fear of losing investment. This places the country’s people and environment at risk.
Indigenous peoples affected by poorly planned or managed development have no
opportunity to change plans before they are enacted, and have little chance to obtain
reparation for damages suffered.
A way of addressing this lack of participation in the development process is through
the National Contact Point (“NCP”) review process created by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(“Guidelines”). NCP review allows an affected group to challenge a specific instance
where a Multinational violated the Guidelines. A challenge can be based on future plans,
as well as actions that occurred in the past. Raising a specific instance initiates a review
process that evaluates the particular concerns of the indigenous people who brought the
challenge. Although the NCP itself has no enforcement power, bringing a challenge
under the Guidelines may affect third-party relationships with the Multinational,
influencing its behavior through peer pressure.
NCP review provides a powerful tool to otherwise underrepresented indigenous
peoples in the development context. The use of NCP review to change mitigation
procedures at a hydroelectric dam in Laos illustrates the process and its effectiveness.
The process of NCP review allows for reconsideration of the development of a mine in
Papua New Guinea that brought environmental destruction and civil war to the
indigenous people of Bougainville.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Global demand for raw materials and national desire for growth
creates pressure on developing countries to exploit their natural resources in
the quest for outside investment.1 This untapped wealth frequently lies in
areas inhabited by indigenous peoples, who far too often have little or no
voice in the development process.2 Displacement or environmental changes
†

Juris Doctor expected, 2007, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Robert Anderson, Jim Bowman, and the editorial and production staff of the Pacific Rim
Law & Policy Journal for their assistance throughout the writing process. Any errors or omissions are the
author’s own.
1
See generally GERARD ELFSTROM, MORAL ISSUES AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 1 (1991);
Rhona K.M. Smith, The International Impact of Creative Problem Solving: Resolving the Plight of
Indigenous Peoples, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 411 (1998).
2
Protection of indigenous lands against government interference and protection of indigenous
peoples against removal from land without full and free consent are considered emerging norms in
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caused by development projects may prove devastating to the affected
people.3 Developers often have little incentive to listen to the complaints of
indigenous peoples.4
The worst-case scenario for a social and environmental disaster
includes government complicity and indifference to the lives of its people.
Government involvement in development can threaten safety and well-being
when the government partners with a developer as a shareholder.5 Profit
sharing may lead to government complicity, or even participation in
atrocities.6 One example of development gone horribly wrong is found in
the experience of the native people of Bougainville, an island of Papua New
Guinea (“PNG”).7
When the mining conglomerate Conzinc Rio Tinto8 found rich copper
deposits on Bougainville in 1960,9 the Australian government10 formed a
partnership with Rio Tinto to build the Panguna copper mine.11 The
government transferred land rights of native villages to Rio Tinto in
international law. However, these rights have yet to be fully recognized. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.07[3][c][i] (2005).
3
See ABDUL AZIZ CHOUDRY, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES IN CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS vii-viii (2003).
4
Smith, supra note 1, at 418.
5
See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk To Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 964, 970 (2004).
6
Id. at 970.
7
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Complaint of Plaintiff, Sarei
v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2000) (No. 2:00-CV-11695),
http://www.hbsslaw.com/files/Final%20Rio%20Tinto%20Complaint1037668347503.pdf [hereinafter Rio
Tinto Complaint]; Roderic Alley, Ethnosecession in Papua New Guinea, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND
SECESSIONISM IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 225, 225-256 (Rajat Ganguly & Ian Macduff eds., 2003);
Moses Havini, The Struggle for Bougainville: Indigenous Peoples Oust Global Mining Giant, in
EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES IN CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 59, 59-88 (Abdul Aziz Choudry
ed., 2003); PAT HOWLEY, BREAKING SPEARS & MENDING HEARTS 26-27 (2002); Moses Havini & Rikha
Havini, Bougainville—The Long Struggle for Freedom, http://www.eco-action.org/dt/bvstory.html (last
visited Apr. 14, 2006); Mineral Resources Forum, Natural Resources and Sustainable Development,
Bougainville
Island—Panguna
Copper
Mine
Conflict,
http://www.natural-resources.org/
minerals/development/indigp/Bougainville.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
8
After a series of mergers and name changes, Conzinc Rio Tinto eventually became part of the Rio
Tinto Group, and will be referred to as Rio Tinto throughout this Comment. For a more detailed
explanation of the merging and name change process, see infra note 187.
9
See Mineral Resources Forum, supra note 7.
10
Bougainville was a German colony from colonization until World War II. Between the end of
World War II and December of 1973, Bougainville and PNG were under Australian authority as United
Nations Trust Territories. Self government was granted to PNG in 1973. In December 1975, PNG gained
full independence and Bougainville was declared part of PNG territory. Before PNG gained full
independence, Bougainville declared its own independence from both Australia and PNG on September 1,
1975. This independence was not recognized, but a deal was struck in 1976 allowing Bougainville limited
autonomy and an independent provincial government. HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 26-27; Mineral Resources
Forum, supra note 7.
11
See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 1.
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exchange for a nineteen percent share in the mine’s output.12 The native
Bougainville islanders soon learned that under Australian law, all property
under the ground belonged to the State of Australia, contrary to indigenous
land practices, and that they were to receive minimal compensation for the
surface land destroyed in construction of the open-pit mine.13 During peak
production, PNG’s share of the Panguna mine profits amounted to seventeen
percent of the nation’s total annual revenue.14
Conflict over the mine began with land seizures and intensified as
development advanced.15
According to allegations brought by the
indigenous people,16 Rio Tinto failed to exercise proper environmental
controls during mine development and operations, causing massive damage
to the ecosystem of the island and surrounding ocean.17 Rio Tinto
“chemically defoliated, bulldozed, and sluiced off an entire mountainside” to
build the mine.18 During operation, “billions of tons of toxic mine waste
was generated and dumped onto the land and into the pristine waters, filling
major rivers with tailings, polluting a major bay dozens of miles away, and
the Pacific Ocean as well.”19
When native demands for environmental cleanup and local profit
investment were ignored by Rio Tinto, a newly-formed militant group, the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (“BRA”), blew up the electricity pylons
for the mine.20 This act of rebellion was primarily intended to draw attention
to the wrongs done to the native people rather than to close the mine, but
when recognition failed, BRA soldiers began to shoot anyone using the mine
access road.21

12

Id.
See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25. Compensation offered by Rio Tinto in at least one location,
Rorovana, was U.S.$105 per acre and $2 per coconut tree. These amounts were non-negotiable. The offer
was made on July 28, 1969, and had to be accepted by August 1, 1969, or nothing would be paid. Rio
Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 26.
14
See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 37. By peak production, PNG had gained independence
and the percentage of annual revenue cited is for the independent nation of PNG. The mine as a source of
revenue did, however, influence Australia’s decision to allow and support construction. Mining revenue
changed PNG from a colonial burden to a source of revenue. See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 26-27.
15
HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25.
16
Although the allegations presented in the Bougainville islanders’ complaint have not been proven
in court, and Rio Tinto did not address them in response briefs, the allegations provide a valuable source of
the islanders’ continued discontent with the events that occurred on Bougainville. See Rio Tinto
Complaint, supra note 7, at 2.
17
Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
18
See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 3.
19
Id.
20
The demands were made in 1989. See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 36.
21
See id.
13
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Local riot police responded with violence, and the PNG military was
called in, allegedly at the demand of and with assistance from Rio Tinto.22
Military and police violence against ordinary citizens led some to join the
BRA, while others joined because of environmental degradation that left
them unable to farm or fish.23 BRA excesses led to the formation of the
Resistance, a separate paramilitary group who aligned themselves with the
PNG army.24
In 1990, PNG soldiers and police withdrew and the two groups of
freedom fighters on Bougainville, the BRA and the Resistance, turned on
each other in a bloody civil war.25 The PNG government set up a military
blockade around the island to coerce the BRA to surrender and bring peace
so that the mine could be reopened.26 The blockade prevented medicine and
other essential items from reaching the island, causing the death of at least
10,000 people between 1990 and 1997, including many women who died in
childbirth and children who died of preventable diseases.27
Although a class action lawsuit was filed against Rio Tinto in United
States Federal District Court,28 this ex post facto attempt to make up for
some of the losses of the indigenous people is an inadequate response to the
problems the mine development has created. No amount of financial
compensation, even if granted, could fully make up for the losses suffered
by affected individuals, nor will money restore the island’s environment to
its former pristine state.29 The allegations raised by the indigenous people of
Bougainville share company with numerous other claims brought to U.S.
courts in an attempt to gain at least some redress for suffering.30
22

See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 4.
See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 36-37; Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 3.
24
See HOWLEY, supra note 7. at 44, n.3.
25
See id. at 38, 44.
26
See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 1.
27
See id. at 4; Mineral Resources Forum, supra note 7.
28
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The case was
dismissed on summary judgment, the court invoking the political question doctrine, and is on appeal in the
Ninth Circuit as of April 2006.
29
Some of the problems raised by taking such claims to foreign courts will be briefly examined infra
Part II, but a complete discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this Comment.
30
Cases include Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (Indonesian
plaintiff alleged defendants were liable for environmental and human rights abuses and genocide in
connection with mining activities in Indonesia); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal.
2000) (Burmese plaintiffs alleged Unocal was liable or vicariously liable for human rights abuses by the
Burmese military in conjunction with the construction of a gas pipeline); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No.
01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. 2002) (Indonesian plaintiffs allege liability by Exxon for human rights abuses
committed by Indonesian military in Sumatra). See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K.
MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (2003) (arguing that expansion
of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) beyond its original intended purpose could threaten globalization by
23
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A method of resolving disputes before significant problems arise is
needed to protect indigenous peoples from the negative consequences of
international development. This may require resolution attempts even
before physical work has begun on a development project. Particularly
when the national government is involved with such a project, indigenous
peoples need a means of third-party, disinterested project evaluation before
the project has proceeded far enough to have caused substantial harm.
This Comment argues that indigenous peoples should use the “soft
power”31 created in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Revision
2000, to establish project review that specifically addresses their concerns
about development projects. The OECD Guidelines established a system of
National Contact Point (“NCP”) review, which can provide an effective
method for indigenous peoples to have their concerns addressed before
development begins. This review can prevent at least some of the human
rights abuses and environmental degradation that may occur either during
the course of development or when a disenfranchised people retaliate in an
attempt to regain what they believe was wrongfully taken. Indigenous
peoples around the Pacific Rim who are facing development that will strip
native lands from them should use the tool of NCP review to ensure levels of
project review that will protect their land and traditions for themselves and
for future generations.
This Comment will evaluate NCP review exclusively as a tool for
indigenous peoples to limit the harms of development. Indigenous peoples
require protection from the particular harms caused by development projects
led by Multinationals,32 as do others in developing countries in the Pacific
leading to curtailed Multinational investment in developing countries for fear of devastating lawsuits in
U.S. courts). Seven of thirty-eight ATS cases have been brought from Asian nations.
31
See infra note 75.
32
Multinationals are only generally defined in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:
A precise definition of multinational enterprises is not required for the purposes of
the Guidelines. These usually comprise companies or other entities established in more
than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various
ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence
over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary
widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, state or
mixed. The Guidelines are addressed to all the entities within the multinational enterprise
(parent companies and/or local entities). According to the actual distribution of
responsibilities among them, the different entities are expected to co-operate and to assist
one another to facilitate observance of the Guidelines.
THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES pt. 1.I.3 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
The terms multinational corporation and transnational corporation are frequently used interchangeably
with the term multinational enterprise. These include the parent company, located in the country of origin,
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Rim. Because they are often marginalized and underrepresented in their
own national governments, indigenous peoples provide a particularly clear
illustration of groups without protection from development. It is important
to note that other potential tools are available to indigenous groups,
including certain international protections that population groups who are
simply poor or marginalized do not have.33 In contrast, the NCP review
process is available to any under-represented group. This Comment will not
evaluate the effectiveness of other tools, but will look only at NCP review as
one tool that can be used, either alone or in concert with international
protections, to allow indigenous peoples to mitigate impacts of future
development projects without violence and prior to breaking ground.
Part II will explain how NCP review provides an ideal method for
protecting indigenous peoples from poorly planned or mismanaged
development, both because of its ability to preempt problems with
development projects and because of its capacity to be invoked by any
person. Part III evaluates the effectiveness of NCP review. An analysis of
challenges to a hydroelectric dam project in Laos shows how NCP review
was used to mitigate the effects of development, as indicated by improved
environmental and relocation mitigation measures and continuing peace in a
historically rebellious region. The NCP official recommendations to the
Laotian dam development illustrate the balance found between the needs of
indigenous peoples and the awareness of the soft authority of the NCP to
enforce its own recommendations. The effectiveness of NCP review as a
partial solution to the forced silence of indigenous peoples allows for
reconsideration of the Bougainville disaster in Papua New Guinea. By
providing a route for adequate communication and developer response, NCP
review could have helped avoid the disastrous consequences of the Panguna
mine.

and the host country extensions, or foreign subsidiaries. They may be commercial or industrial, and may
be state or privately owned. Although many Multinationals are large firms, they may also be small.
MICHAEL GHERTMAN & MARGARET ALLEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MULTINATIONALS 2 (1984).
33
See COHEN, supra note 2, § 5.07[3][c]. Particularly relevant to the topics addressed in this
Comment is section 5.07[3][c], Emerging Norms Concerning Land and Territory. The Inter-American
Human Rights Committee, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights have expressly recognized the special relationship indigenous peoples have with their lands. Id. §
5.07[3][c][i]. The U.N. Draft Declaration defines “land” broadly, including the right of indigenous peoples
to “own, develop, control and use lands and territories, including the total environment of the lands, air,
waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources” traditionally used. See also id. at n.642
(citing U.N. DRAFT DECLARATION, art. 26). These standards are emerging norms of international law, and
are soft law without enforcement mechanisms. See infra Part III. Their existence does not mean that
action will be taken according to their precepts. Although some countries, such as Australia, Brazil,
Canada, and Nicaragua, have laws that protect native rights to land, most do not. Id. § 5.07[3][c][ii].
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NCP REVIEW PROVIDES AN IDEAL METHOD OF PROTECTING
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES BECAUSE IT PREEMPTS PROBLEMS WITH
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND CAN BE APPLIED GLOBALLY BY ANY
PERSON

NCP review, created under the authority of the OECD to provide a
dispute resolution forum for those affected by Multinational activity, can be
used by indigenous peoples to create a review of development plans and lead
to possible mitigation of the development’s effect on them.
A.

The OECD is Structured to Influence the Global Economy

NCP review exists through the enactment of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises.34 The OECD itself is made up of thirty member
nations35 with a shared commitment to democratic government, and has
relationships with approximately seventy other countries and nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), giving the organization a global
reach.36 The OECD influences the global economy through the production
of internationally agreed instruments, decisions, and recommendations.37
The OECD was designed as a forum for the governments of market
democracies to work together to address the challenges and exploit the
opportunities of globalization.38 OECD Acts are “soft law,” non-binding
instruments designed to improve policy through focusing peer pressure on
non-compliant member nations.39 An important function of the OECD is
providing the data necessary for governments to be aware of changes and
developments that affect the global economy, in addition to providing advice
on how best to deal with those changes.40 The OECD is designed to assist
governments in fighting poverty and fostering prosperity through “economic
growth, financial stability, trade and investment technology, innovation,
entrepreneurship, and development co-operation . . . to ensure that economic
34

See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt 1.I.10.
The member states are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. OECD Home, About, http://www.oecd.org/about/
0,2337,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter OECD Home] (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
36
Id.
37
Id. OECD acts address such varied topics as agriculture, tourism, labor and employment,
development assistance, nuclear management, international investment and multinational enterprises, and
energy. See OECD Decisions, Recommendations and Other Instruments in Force, http://webdomino1.oecd
.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
38
OECD, THE OECD 7 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf.
39
Id. On occasion, these agreements may lead to formal agreements or treaties. Id.
40
Id.
35
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growth, social development and environmental protection are achieved
together.”41
The OECD grew out of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, created in 1947 to coordinate European reconstruction under
the Marshall Plan.42 Twenty countries ratified the formation of the OECD,
but it has moved beyond providing direct assistance exclusively to its thirty
member nations to now supplying information and analysis to more than
seventy developing economies.43 As globalization has changed the market,
the OECD has progressed from analyses of policy areas in individual
countries to an examination of the interaction of various policies on a global
scale.44
B.

The OECD Guidelines Are Designed to Promote Policies Meant to
Contribute to Sound Economic Expansion and Multilateral, NonDiscriminatory Enlargement of World Trade 45

The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are a set of
voluntary standards for responsible business conduct in a variety of areas,
including human rights and the environment.46 The Guidelines were
founded on the notion that international guidelines for Multinationals can
“help prevent misunderstandings and build an atmosphere of mutual
confidence and predictability between business, labour, and governments.”47
Governments adhering to the Guidelines, including the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Japan,48 are committed to
promoting them among Multinational Enterprises operating within or from
their territories.49

41

Id.
Id. at 9.
43
Id.
44
Id. Such analyses include work on sustainable development and consideration of environmental,
social, and economic issues beyond national borders.
45
See CONVENTION ON THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(Dec. 14, 1960), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_
1_1,00.html; GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 2-7.
46
GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at Part 1.II.2.
47
OECD Home, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2349370_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter OECD
FAQ] (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
48
Adhering nations include the thirty member nations and nine non-member countries: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia. See OECD, GUIDELINES for
Multinational Enterprises, About, http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_34889_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
(last visited June 1, 2006).
49
See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 5.
42
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The Guidelines are one of many business codes of conduct, but the
only multilaterally endorsed, comprehensive code that governments have
committed to promoting.50 Adhering countries are home to most of the
world’s Multinationals51 and supply more than sixty percent of the world’s
goods and services.52 Thus, the Guidelines express the shared values of
member governments, and influence the majority of Multinational
investment.53
C.

The OECD’s Goal of Promoting Sustainable, Stable Global Growth
Reaches Fruition in NCP Review

The Guidelines are implemented through a system of National
Contact Points (“NCPs”), government offices responsible for promoting and
encouraging observance of the Guidelines.54 Each national NCP helps
resolve Guideline implementation issues related to specific instances of
business conduct in its country.55 In addition, each NCP is meant to further
the effectiveness of the Guidelines by informing prospective investors of
them and ensuring that the Guidelines are known and available.56
The existence of an NCP for each adhering country is essential to
determine how effective the Guidelines are in each country.57 Observance of
the Guidelines by member countries is voluntary; each adhering country
invests the Guidelines with importance as it sees fit.58 Each nation
determines the organization of its NCP, with the expectation that all will
function in a visible, accessible, transparent, and accountable manner.59 The
majority of NCPs are single-department entities with consultative structures
that allow for input from labor, business, and NGOs; other NCPs have been
established as tripartite or quadripartite entities that incorporate multiple
government bodies but do not provide for input from non-governmental
entities.60
A party affected by a business practice in violation of the Guidelines
can bring a challenge, known as a specific instance, for review before a NCP
50

OECD FAQ, supra note 47.
Id.
52
The OECD, supra note 38, at 8.
53
OECD FAQ, supra note 47.
54
See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.I.1-5.
55
Id. pt. 2.I.
56
Id. pt. 2.III.I.B.2.
57
Id.
58
OECD FAQ, supra note 47.
59
See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 2.III.I.A.
60
See, e.g., The Australian National Contact Point, http://www.ausncp.gov.au/content/what
.asp?areaid=7 (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
51
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if the Multinational’s home country is an adhering member of the
Guidelines.61 The NCP of the home country provides review regardless of
where the specific instance occurred.62 Thus, although a minority of nations
worldwide is adhering members, the majority of international commerce
falls within the realm of NCP review.63 Remedies for violations usually
consist of recommendations made by the NCP, and the majority of
challenges so far have ended in settlement.64 Another possibility, although
uncommon, is for the home nation to take legal action based on the
complaints.65
D.

NCP Review Is Advantageous in the Context of Protecting Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights

The NCP review process creates a method for indigenous peoples to
create an additional level of project review by requiring disinterested thirdparty evaluation of a project before construction begins or land is seized, in
an attempt to ensure that minimum standards for development projects are
met and to protect the well-being of affected parties.66
1.

Review Prior to Project Construction Contributes to Sustainable
Global Development

The loss of land or change in environment in a subsistence-based
economy can be devastating to the people directly affected, but the failure to
develop may be equally damaging to the government of a developing
country attempting to participate in a market-based global economy.67
61
NCP review can also be used by a party to obtain review when the party and the Multinational
share nationality. A specific instance was brought to the United States NCP by a U.S. NGO and against a
U.S. corporation. See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: SPECIFIC INSTANCES
CONSIDERED BY NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS 11 (June 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
15/43/33914891.pdf.
62
GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 2.III.I.C.
63
THE OECD, supra note 38, at 6.
64
SOMO, Table of Cases Raised by NGOs at National Contact Points (Jan. 2005),
http://www.corporate-accountability.org/eng/documents/2005/feb_2005_update_on_oecd_cases_raised_by
_ngos_at_national_contact_points_by_oecd_watch_pdf_38_kb.pdf [hereinafter Table of Cases].
65
For example, UK government officials have responded to allegations against British Petroleum for
seeking tax and law exemptions and undue influence of foreign governments. See id. at 4.
66
GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.I.
67
The analysis presented in this Comment takes for granted the development of market based
economic development, which itself is a target of criticism. This Comment does not argue for a new world
order, but addresses an issue of ongoing concern in the world as it now exists. For criticism of the
economic strategies that changed Third World pastoral economies to free market economic regimes, see
generally MAKERE STEWART-HAREWIRA, THE NEW IMPERIAL ORDER, INDIGENOUS RESPONSES TO
GLOBALIZATION 146-163 (2005).
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Development is necessary for these nations, and international investment is a
crucial source of the required development capital.68 Although some
funding comes from foreign nations or international organizations, such as
the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, much investment is
provided by Multinationals as foreign direct investment (“FDI”).69
Multinationals do not generally police their own behavior, and the
governments of developing countries face difficulties in controlling
Multinational activity. Peripheral interests, such as the effect of a
development project on indigenous peoples or on the physical environment,
is not the primary concern of Multinationals, which are only legally obliged
to consider the welfare of their stockholders—individuals rarely directly
affected by the development projects of held companies.70 Because
Multinationals provide an important source of development funding for
developing nations, poor nations eager for investment capital may turn a
blind eye to actions by Multinationals that cause harm or have the potential
to cause harm to the host country’s people.71 At times, the nation itself may
partner with the Multinational to financially benefit from the investment
opportunity, again at terrible cost to the nation’s people.72 In such a
situation, the threatened or injured people often have no access to outside

68

See CARLOS M. CORREA & NAGESH KUMAR, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT: IMPLICATIONS
OF A WTO REGIME AND POLICY OPTIONS 141-162 (2003).
69
See JOHN H. DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 528-29 (1992)
(“Multinationals are the primary repositories of the capital, technology and organizational capabilities
necessary to promote the economic welfare of societies”). Multinational corporations are the primary
mechanism of foreign direct investment. See Sidney E. Rolfe, The International Corporation in
Perspective, in THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 5, 5-6 (Sidney E. Rolfe &
Walter Damm eds., 1970). FDI is distinguished from foreign investment, which includes both FDI and
loans. See MICHAEL J. TWOMEY, A CENTURY OF FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 1 (2000);
CORREA & KUMAR, supra note 68, at 1-3.
70
See Rose Francis, Water Justice in South Africa: Natural Resources Policy at the Intersection of
Human Rights, Economics, and Political Power, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 158 (2005).
71
See Chantal Thomas, Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1399, 1417
(2003) (stating that pressures and opportunities arising from international trade liberalization may cause a
government to lessen its maintenance of human rights); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d
1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (allegations of environmental and human rights abuses in a joint venture between a
developer and the government of Papua New Guinea); Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of Union of Burma v. Unocal,
Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (allegations of human rights abuses during joint-venture between the
Burmese government and an American corporation in construction of natural gas pipeline). This problem
may be further exacerbated by the information asymmetry between the governments of developing
countries and the track record of the Multinational in other developing countries with regard to social
responsibility. See CORREA & KUMAR, supra note 68, at 148.
72
See Thomas, supra note 71, at 1417 (stating that pressures and opportunities arising from
international trade liberalization may cause a government to lessen its maintenance of human rights); Sarei,
221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 ; Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of Union of Burma, 176 F.R.D. 329.
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help.73 Without governmental concern for the well-being of its people, a
group that finds itself in the path of an important national development
project has little chance to voice its objections.74
The Guidelines address these issues by providing a way for parties to
communicate before irreversible action is taken. Furthermore, NCP review
forces developers to respond to the specific concerns raised by the affected
people. In a situation where a developer does not provide an opportunity for
the affected people to express their concerns, NCP review may be the only
means of communication between opposing sides.
2.

The OECD Guidelines Provide an Ideal Means of Encouraging
Multinational Responsibility Because They Apply Globally and Their
Soft Authority Does Not Threaten Multinational Independence

As soft law, NCP review is particularly appropriate for indigenous
peoples in developing countries.75 The OECD Guidelines and the NCP
review process embody some of the greatest advantages of soft law:
compromise and broad applicability. Soft law allows non-state actors to
participate more actively in international relations than is possible under a
traditional law-making process.76 The Guidelines were established by the
OECD, an international organization without the power to adopt binding
instruments;77 a soft law agreement is the only method for the OECD to be
73
See Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples' Ownership of Natural Resources in
International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 33, 59-61 (2006).
74
See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 36, 102-103 (1998) (arguing that national sovereignty provides nations alone with
the ability to truly promote sustainable development).
75
NCP review is created under the OECD Guidelines, whose legally non-binding norms are
distinguished from traditional concepts of law, which have enforceable, precise, legally binding
obligations. See Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 51, 51 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds.,
2003); John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable
Global Governance, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 8, 8 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004). The
Guidelines contain language that encourages or discourages certain behavior but have no power to force or
prohibit action by a Multinational. GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.I.1. Soft law, like the Guidelines, has
been criticized in international affairs for its lack of enforceability because it has no independent judiciary
or enforcement body. See Abbot & Snidal, supra at 51. Hard law relies on state power not only for
creation and implementation of laws, but also for their enforcement. See Kirton & Trebilcock, supra at 9.
Recommendations made by a NCP generally are not enforceable on their own accord. See GUIDELINES,
supra note 32, pt. I.1. Enforcement only occurs when a national government chooses to take independent
action based on an NCP complaint. For example UK officials have acted on complaints against British
Petroleum. See Table of Cases, supra note 64.
76
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
77
See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at forward.
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involved in an international agreement.
Soft agreements facilitate
compromise, may be drafted and accepted more quickly than hard law,78 and
allow arrangements between actors who operate under a power imbalance,
or sovereign states protective of their autonomy.79 The minimal enforcement
power of the Guidelines, and low threat of the Guidelines to state
sovereignty allowed for agreement between a large number of countries in
creating the guidelines.80 Soft law instruments also create methods by which
such instruments can be applied to multiple, diverse legal systems.81 The
language of Guideline provisions, while phrased to be not strictly binding,
can be applied in all adhering and destination countries.82
NCP review itself can function to facilitate compromise between
different stakeholders in a development project, and works effectively
despite any power imbalance between the negotiating parties.83 Through
their role as stakeholder representatives, NGOs can actively participate in
international relations. Perhaps most importantly, the review process
provides the framework for discussion that can help preempt problems that
would later require adjudication. Soft law helps avoid the need for
adjudication by “providing a framework for negotiation and other nonadjudicative forms of dispute resolution by creating expectations as to the
frame of reference for the conduct of negotiations.”84
The advantages of soft law become obvious when the governments of
developing countries are faced with a choice between inviting much-needed
investment into their countries, and protecting the environment and rights of
marginalized, indigenous peoples. Using government regulations to protect
the natural environment and the safety of the people affected by
development projects may not be a practical or likely solution for a country
that desires to provide jobs for its people or increase its national revenues.85
A developing country that establishes high environmental or social standards

78

See Abbot & Snidal, supra note 75, at 52; SHELTON, supra note 75, at 13. But cf. C.M. Chinkin,
The Challenge of Soft Law: Development Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 850, 852
(1989) [hereinafter Chinkin, Soft Law] (arguing that “[d]espite the potential disadvantages of treaties the
reality is that the process of negotiating a soft law instrument can often be as complex and lengthy as that
for the negotiation of a treaty”).
79
Abbot & Snidal, supra note 75, at 52-53.
80
See OECD Home, supra note 35.
81
SHELTON, supra note 75, at 12.
82
See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, passim.
83
See Table of Cases, supra note 64.
84
Chinkin, Soft Law, supra note 78, at 862.
85
See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 395-396 (2005); José E. Alvarez, Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis &
Robert W. Staiger, It's a Question of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 61 (2002).

716

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 15 NO. 3

may push some FDI to a country with lower standards.86 Few countries that
feel they desperately need this money would pass even minimal restrictions
on investment, for fear that they would turn away investment possibilities.87
Forcing a Multinational to take specific action to protect human rights or the
environment is not within the power of most indigenous groups in
developing countries.88 Limitations that apply to a Multinational regardless
of location, rather than those that apply only in certain destination countries,
protect all destination countries equally without punishing those that desire
protection. The Guidelines accomplish this by applying to development
projects regardless of their location, when the Multinational originates in an
adhering state.89 As such, the Guidelines afford destination countries some
degree of protection from abuse by Multinationals, without the need to pass
laws that would, in effect, deter business and investment.
3.

The NCP Review Process Is Ideal for Indigenous Peoples in
Developing Countries Because Its Neutral Forum Provides a Flexible
Approach to Parties and Ripeness

When a national government is implicated in wrongdoing, particularly
when the State has a weak judicial system, a plaintiff cannot anticipate fair
treatment from national courts.90 National courts may also be inadequate in
size or experience for lengthy, complicated trials.91 The courts of a foreign
nation may be prohibitively expensive, if not legally unavailable.92
86

Alvarez et al., supra note 85, at 61.
Id.
88
See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 56-59 (2001).
89
GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at Declaration I (“[Adhering governments] jointly recommend to
multinational enterprises operating in or from their territories the observance of the Guidelines.”).
90
One illustration of this is the decision by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
regarding the case of Mary & Carrie Dann. (Case No. 11.140) (Report No. 113/01, Oct. 15, 2001). The
Shoshone sisters petitioned in federal court, claiming the U.S. federal government’s assertion of title over
tribal lands was racially discriminatory. After this petition was rejected, the Commission issued a decision
in 2001 “acknowledging the rights of indigenous peoples in general to their traditional lands and finding
that the United States had deprived Mary and Carrie Dann of their lands held under aboriginal title through
unfair procedures.” Like a NCP, the Commission does not have authority to render a binding decision, but
its decisions may draw international attention to a nation’s shortcomings. COHEN, supra note 2,
§ 5.07[2][e].
91
See ELFSTROM, supra note 1, at 36-38 (examining the government of India’s choice to bring suit
on behalf of injured plaintiffs in U.S. court).
92
In the United States, actions of nations are rarely subject to prosecution because of sovereign
immunity or the application of the “act of state” doctrine. Individual plaintiffs cannot sue in the United
States a corporation involved in a particular project without a sufficient connection between the defendant
and the United States. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
state. Domestic Effect of Foreign Acts or Laws, Act-of-State Doctrine, 48 C.J.S. International Law § 27
(2006); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing the risk
87
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International courts may be closed to individual plaintiffs, and formal
arbitration may be too costly.93 Furthermore, taking claims to foreign courts
implicates issues of sovereignty and may be detrimental to world trade.94
NCP review provides an alternative to proceedings in these courts, and thus
an increased likelihood that the plaintiff’s claims will be heard in an
unbiased and capable venue.
Using courts also presents issues related to ripeness. Before
environmental or human rights devastation takes place, plaintiffs do not have
standing to bring a claim because the issue is not yet ripe for judicial
decision-making.95 If a population waits until after the negative event has
occurred, the claim may be ripe, but the damage has been wrought, and no
amount of restoration, even if available, can fully restore life or land.
Mitigation measures, if they are carried out, may seem inadequate to the
displaced people, particularly if representatives of the government or the
developer do not take the time to listen and respond to their concerns.96
NCP review sidesteps problems of ripeness because it may occur at
any point during the development process, including the initial stages of
project planning,97 while the Multinational is engaged in its work within the
country,98 or even after the Multinational has withdrawn from the affected
country.99 This broad timeline for applicability allows claims to be made
whenever, and even before, problems arise.

of attracting an action for champerty or maintenance in a PNG court, but holding that contingency fee
contracts are available for legal fees.)
93
See generally JEAN ALLAIN, A CENTURY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE RULE OF LAW
AND ITS LIMITS (2000); JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §1.1 (2d ed. 1997).
94
See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 30, at 9, 37-43.
95
In the United States, at least, the doctrine of ripeness prevents pre-enforcement judicial review
when those who will eventually feel the impact of the action is not yet felt when conducting daily affairs.
See 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §457 (2006).
96
For further discussion of this point, see infra Part III.A..
97
This is the case in NT2 development. See Proyecto Gato et administrative law., Complaint Letter
(Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.proyectogato.be/NCPcomplaint.htm [hereinafter NT2 Complaint].
98
Decisions based on specific instances raised during the course of multinational activity in the host
country include: Netherlands National Contact Point, Joint Statement by NNCP, Adidas, and ICN (Dec. 12,
2002), http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2489211_1_1_1_1,00.html (follow
“Joint statement by the Netherlands NCP, Adidas and the India Committee of the Netherlands and
Background report” hyperlink); Swedish National Contact Point, Statement with Reference to Specific
Instances Received Concerning Atlas Copco and Sandvik (June 2003), http://www.oecd.org/document/
59/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2489211_1_1_1_1,00.html (follow “Statement from the Swedish NCP
concerning Atlas Copco and Sandvik” hyperlink); United Kingdom National Contact Point, Statement on
DeBeers (April 24, 2004), http://www.dti.gov.uk/ewt/statements.htm (follow “De Beers” hyperlink).
99
The U.N. brought its claim against Avient after the Multinational had ceased all activity in the
Congo.
See United Kingdom National Contact Point, Statement on Avient (Sept. 8, 2004),
http://www.dti.gov.uk/ewt/statements.htm (follow “Avient” hyperlink).
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Although standing to bring a claim is broadly allowed under the
Guidelines, NGOs commonly bring claims on behalf of various groups.100 A
petitioning party’s methods of gathering data to support its claim are limited
only by practical considerations, as illustrated by the costs incurred by the
Nam Theun II NGO representatives who commissioned private studies to
support their challenges.101 NGOs may also participate in NCP organized
events designed to promote the Guidelines in destination countries.102
Since 2000, thirty-nine NCPs have examined a total of forty-seven
instances where a petitioner claimed a violation of the Guidelines.103 NGOs
have brought twenty-two challenges, with several NGOs having brought
challenges in multiple countries.104 Nineteen cases are currently pending,105
at least fourteen cases have settled,106 and other cases concluded with the
NCP’s formal decision.107
4.

The NCP Review Process Is Effective Because It Is a Form of
Alternative Dispute Resolution that Can Provide Equitable Outcomes
to Indigenous Peoples

Alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) provides an alternative both to
informal protest and to the traditional legal opportunities which may be
lacking for indigenous peoples. The NCP review process is a form of ADR
that is particularly appropriate for indigenous peoples because it allows
concerns to be addressed while protecting against power imbalance between
indigenous peoples and Multinationals by limiting the forum and forcing the
opposing party to come to the table.108

100

See generally OECD Watch, Cases, http://www.oecdwatch.org/406.htm (last visited Apr. 14,

2006).
101
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS NETWORK AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, Summary: Nam Theun 2
Technical Reviews (Feb. 2005), http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/pdf/namtheun/050316annex1.pdf;
International Rivers Network, Technical Reviews, http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/namtheun.php?id
=namtheuntech.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
102
See OECD FAQ, supra note 47.
103
OECD Watch, Cases, supra note 100.
104
See Table of Cases, supra note 64.
105
OECD Watch, Cases, supra note 100.
106
See OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Specific Instances Considered by
National Contact Points 2-11 (June 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/33914891.pdf [hereinafter
Specific Instances].
107
OECD Watch, Cases, supra note 100. Other cases ended for a variety of reasons, including
decisions reached in parallel legal proceedings, a finding of no Guidelines violations, withdrawal by the
submitting party, and inadequate investment nexus to the NCP country. See also Specific Instances, supra
note 106, at 2-11.
108
See GRENIG, supra note 93, §1.1 (1997).
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ADR benefits the affected indigenous group because outcomes are not
reduced exclusively to a win or lose formulation, as they commonly are in
an adjudicative context.109 As players with little power, inadequate
resources, and no negotiating leverage, traditional methods of resolving
disputes are largely unavailable or inadequate for indigenous peoples.110
NCP review provides a method for resolving disputes that indigenous people
can access, and that allows for widespread involvement of community
members. By allowing more interested voices in the process of creation,
solutions may benefit all affected parties.
The NCP review process is particularly appropriate for indigenous
peoples, compared to some traditional ADR methods. For instance,
indigenous peoples are often unable to force negotiation independently, or
negotiate fairly if the process does begin, due to their lack of power.111 NCP
substitutes its process for negotiation leverage by providing a forum for
indigenous peoples to ensure that Multinationals become aware of and
respond to their concerns. A common result of such forums has been
voluntary mitigation on the part of the Multinationals,112 or settlements that
successfully resolve the alleged violations, before an NCP decision is even
reached.113
109

Christine Chinkin, Alternative Dispute Resolution under International Law, in REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 123, 124 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998) [hereinafter
Chinkin, Alternative Dispute Resolution].
110
Unfavorable outcomes could also disrupt any beneficial precedent in countries that have
acknowledged some indigenous rights. See Michael Mirande, Sustainable Natural Resource Development,
Legal Dispute, and Indigenous Peoples: Problem-Solving Across Cultures, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 35-38
(1997).
111
On Bougainville, some negotiation demands by the Panguna Landowners Association and other
groups were ignored or denied. The most successful negotiation, in the sense that an agreement was
signed, occurred to prevent a native group from appealing a case to an Australian appeals court. The
landowners claim that only the threat of military and police force led them to enter what they saw as an
interim and inadequate solution. Havini, supra note 7, at 73-74; HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25.
112
See Steve Inskeep, Wolfensohn Reflects on the World Bank, audio broadcast on National Public
Radio, May 10, 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4645837 (follow “Listen”
hyperlink to download audio) (indicating that challenges to NT2 led to improved mitigation and
environmental protection) [hereinafter NPR Interview].
113
In this context, settlement may indicate a more successful resolution of the alleged violations; a
number of actual decisions have left the NGOs that brought the claims disappointed or unsatisfied. See
Table of Cases, supra note 64. If during the process of review, the Multinational voluntarily changes
behavior or plans, then there is no need to monitor or force compliance. The only publicized instance of
NCP review having a measurable negative consequence on a Multinational is in the Avient case, a
challenge to Avient’s alleged contribution to conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by
providing military equipment. Avient claimed that banks, organizations, and governments used the
allegations as reasons why they could not do business with Avient. The NCP for the United Kingdom
clarified that the Guidelines are not meant to act as an instrument of sanction or to hold a corporation to
account, but to be a problem-solving mechanism with view to the parties coming together to an agreement.
See Statement on Avient, supra note 99.
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III.

THE NCP PROCESS AS APPLIED: ENABLING SUCCESS IN LAOS AND
RECONSIDERATION OF THE BOUGAINVILLE DISASTER

NCP Review under the OECD Guidelines is a potent and promising
tool to ensure that the process of development does not do irreparable harm
while it is trying to accomplish good.
A.

Mitigating the Effects of the Nam Theun II Dam in Laos

The OECD NCP process is clearly illustrated by the challenges
brought against EDF, the French lead developer of the Nam Theun II
(“NT2”) hydroelectric dam in Laos, subject to review by the French NCP.
The dam, when constructed, will disrupt traditional farming and fishing
activities of 50,000 to 130,000 people,114 open pristine rainforest to logging
and development, and encroach on the habitat of several endangered
species.115 NT2 is not the first hydroelectric project in Laos, and at least five
previously constructed projects have caused devastating changes to the
affected people and environment, without bringing the promised economic
benefits.116
The case for NT2 is strongly supported by its promised financial
benefits to the nation of Laos.117 Laos is one of the world’s least developed
countries and is very poor; the majority of the population lives on less than a
dollar a day.118 Because of its primitive infrastructure, development
opportunity is limited.119 NT2 promises a poor country with few natural
resources an opportunity to turn one of its few ample natural resources—
rain—into an exportable commodity—electricity—that can be sold in
Southeast Asia’s rapidly growing energy market.120
114
See WWF (World Wildlife Fund), Position Statement: Nam Theun 2 Project, Lao PDR (May 9,
2003), http://assets.panda.org/downloads/namtheun2dampositionpapermay2003.pdf.
115
See David J.H. Blake, Review of the Nakai-Nam Theun Social and Environmental Management
Framework and First Operational Plan (SEMFOP-1) for the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project (Jan.
2005), http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/pdf/namtheun/NT2FishImpacts.05.02.09.pdf [hereinafter
SEMFOP-1]; Divisive Dam Likely to Go Ahead, NATION, Feb. 8, 2004.
116
For a case study of the consequences of five previous hydroelectric projects, see INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS NETWORK, The Legacy of Hydro in Laos, http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/ (follow “Legacy
of Hydro in Laos” hyperlink) (arguing that affected people are worse off after dam construction and raising
questions of whether the Lao government has the capacity and political will in future hydroelectric projects
to ensure adequate monitoring, full and fair distribution of compensation, and environmental protection).
117
See Nam Theun 2 Power, How Will the Project Benefit the Lao Macro Economy?,
http://www.namtheun2.com/faq/faq_lao.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
118
U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: LAOS (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/la.html.
119
Id.; WWF, supra note 114; NPR Interview, supra note 112.
120
See Yuthana Praiwan, Nam Theun 2 to Help Cut Power Bills, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 7, 2006.
Ninety-five percent of the power generated at NT2 will be sold to Thailand. Id.
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The project funding structure for NT2 provides an enticing form of
international investment.
NT2 is a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer121
122
Project. Anticipated direct revenue for Laos through dividends, taxes, and
royalties is approximately U.S.$1.9 billion over the concession period of
twenty-five years, or U.S.$75 million per year—representing 4.4 percent of
the country’s GNP and thirty percent of the annual national budget.123 At the
end of the direct revenue period, ownership of NT2 will be transferred to the
government of Laos at no cost, although the project is designed to function
beyond this time.124
Building NT2 will undoubtedly have consequences on both local
people and the environment.125 NCP review provided a way for the affected
people to try to ensure that the consequences will be adequately mitigated.126
Specific concerns raised by the NGOs under seven provisions of the
Guidelines challenged inadequate mitigation for the impact on displaced
villagers and plant and animal species.127
Individual challenges focused on the human rights of displaced
people.128 More than one thousand subsistence farming families—a total
population of over six thousand—will be displaced by the reservoir
formation,129 and the traditional farming and fishing of 50,000 to 130,000
people will be disturbed.130 Displaced farmers will lose their houses and the
land their families have used for rotational farming for hundreds of years,
121
As a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer enterprise, EDF will construct and operate NT2 and maintain
ownership of the dam for the direct revenue period of 25 years. See Letter from EDF to French National
Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Dec. 8, 2004) (translation by EDF of
French
original),
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/EDF-letter-NCP-OECD-8-Dec-2004-Englishtranslation.doc [hereinafter EDF Letter].
122
The Nam Theun II Power Company (NTPC) was founded in 2002 as a concession agreement with
the Lao government. The principal shareholder in the development, future head contractor for construction,
and service provider to the operator NTPC is Électricité de France (EDF), a network of associated
companies headquartered in France. The project consists of development, construction, and operation of a
trans-basin diversion hydropower project using water from the Nam Theun River, a Mekong River
tributary. The anticipated area of impact stretches from the Nakai Plateau to the lower Xe Bang Fai river
confluence with the Mekong River. See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97.
123
See EDF Letter, supra note 121.
124
See id.
125
See WORLD BANK, Nam Theun 2 Power Project, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/
main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&theSitePK=40941&Projectid=P076445 (last visited Apr. 14,
2006).
126
GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 3.36.
127
See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97.
128
GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.II.2 (“Respect the human rights of those affected by their
activities consistent with the host government’s international obligations and commitments.”).
129
Response to Letter from EDF to the National Contact Point of France 4 (Feb. 25, 2005),
http://www.amisdelaterre.org/IMG/pdf/response_edf_ncp_feb_05_final.pdf [hereinafter NCP Response
Letter].
130
See WWF, supra note 114.
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including their rice paddies and land for buffalo grazing.131 Forests used for
gathering non-timber products will be logged and flooded.132 The concerned
NGOs claim the Mitigation Compensation Program calls for replacement by
one of four possible livelihood options per family: (1) 0.66 hectares of
irrigated agricultural land; (2) grazing lands for livestock and provision of at
least two large animals per family; (3) reservoir fisheries; or (4) commercial
forestry from land along the reservoir.133 The plan also encourages the
creation of service or business enterprises, including tailoring, machine
repair, and tourism,134 although support for these services is not planned.135
Challengers allege that the mitigation provisions listed in the
Mitigation and Compensation Program are overly ambitious, inadequate,
not based on an evaluation of the impacted region,136 and in violation of
OECD Guidelines Chapter V, “Environment.”137
The NGO International Rivers Network (“IRN”)138 commissioned its
own studies of the resettlement options.139 Based on the IRN studies, the
NGO complaint lists several actions necessary for the developer to reach
compliance with the Guidelines.140 These focus primarily on the inadequacy
of information supporting the mitigation plans and call for cumulative
economic analysis of the proposals, evidence that experience with other

131

See NCP Response Letter, supra note 129, at 4.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97.
137
GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pts. 1.V.1 (“Establish and maintain a system of environmental
management appropriate to the enterprise, including: (a) Collection and evaluation of adequate and timely
information regarding the environmental, health, and safety impacts of their activities. (b) Establishment of
measurable objectives and, where appropriate, targets for improved environmental performance, including
periodically reviewing the continuing relevance of these objectives.”); id. pt. 1.V.3 (“Assess, and address in
decision-making, the foreseeable environmental, health, and safety-related impacts associated with the
processes, goods and services of the enterprise over their full life cycle. Where these proposed activities
may have significant environmental, health, or safety impacts, and where they are subject to a decision of a
competent authority, prepare an appropriate environmental impact assessment.”)
138
IRN, an NGO based in the United States is one of seven NGOs from around the world which
worked in cooperation to bring the complaint against EDF. The other NGOs are Proyecto Gato (Belgium),
Amis de la Terre (France), Mekong Watch (Japan), World Rainforest Movement (Uruguay), Finnish
Asiatic Society (Finland), and CRBM (Italy). See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97.
139
See David J.H. Blake, A Review of the Nam Theun 2 Environmental Assessment and Management
Plan (EAMP) as It Pertains to Impacts on Xe Bang Fai Fisheries (Jan. 2005), http://www.irn.org/
programs/mekong/pdf/namtheun/NT2FishImpacts.05.02.09.pdf; David J.H. Blake, A Review of the
Adequacy of Compensation Measures for Communities Living Along the Xe Bang Fai River Nam Theun 2
Hydropower Project, Lao PDR (Jan. 2005), http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/pdf/namtheun/
NT2Compensation.05.02.09.pdf; see also SEMFOP-1, supra note 115.
140
See NCP Response Letter, supra note 129, at 2-3.
132

SEPTEMBER 2006

OECD GUIDELINES

723

dams in the region is informing plans for NT2, and a further analysis of
aquaculture and livestock options.141
After reviewing the challenges to EDF’s proposed actions and EDF’s
reply in support of its plan, the French NCP held that no breach of the
Guidelines could be attributed to the company.142 In fact, the French NCP
found that EDF had gone beyond Guideline requirements to sign an
agreement committing itself to social responsibility.143 The NCP did make
two official recommendations, however, because of the NCP’s responsibility
“to watch over the effective implementation of the company’s commitments
to comply with international environmental and social standards.”144
The first recommendation is that EDF must remain involved in
implementing all the compensatory measures, as agreed to with the Lao
government.145 The NCP encourages EDF, along with the Lao developer, to
pursue appropriate protection measures regarding the potential effects of its
activities on the environment.146
The second recommendation specifically addresses the interaction
between Multinationals and “countries where the legal and regulatory
system with regard to environmental and social matters is said to be
weak.”147 The NCP suggests that EDF should “do their utmost to implement
the internationally-acknowledged best practices that they follow in their own
country on the construction site and for the people affected by their activity,”
and proposes that the fundamental standards of the International Labor
Organization148 are “appropriate rules of conduct for the companies within
the scope of their activities.”149
Finally, while not an official recommendation, the NCP proposes
consultations on at least an annual basis regarding follow-up of project
141

Id.
See FRENCH NATIONAL CONTACT POINT, Recommendations of the French National Contact Point
(PCN) Intended for EDF and Its Partners with Regard to the Implementation of the "Nam Theun 2" Project
in
Laos
(Apr.
1,
2005),
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/French-NCP-Nam-Theun-2recommendations-1-April-2005.doc [hereinafter Recommendations]. An unofficial translation of the
French original by EDF is available at http://www.minefi.gouv.fr/TRESOR/pcn/compcn010405.htm.
143
See id.
144
See id. (emphasis in original).
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Eight ILO Conventions on four subjects have been identified by the ILO governing body as
fundamental to the rights of human beings at work, regardless of the level of development of the country.
These subjects are: freedom of association, the abolition of forced labor, equality, and the elimination of
child labor. See International Labour Organization, Fundamental ILO Conventions, http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
149
See Recommendations, supra note 142.
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development, its impacts, and the remedial measures taken, in order to
maintain a high level of best practices.150
NCP review can bring specific challenges to the attention of the World
Bank and other prospective investors in order to create an additional level of
evaluation in areas of particular concern to the indigenous people.151
Although the level of care desired by the indigenous people may be higher
than the World Bank’s minimum development floor, this additional review
ensures at least that minimum.152
Unable to independently fund NT2 development, EDF was reliant
upon World Bank investment for the project, and hoped to reach agreement
in early 2005.153 The NGO complaint brought particular issues to the
consideration of the World Bank.154 If the proposed safeguards and
mitigations had not met the World Bank’s minimum standards, it would not
have agreed to invest in May 2005.155
Protest, including challenges raised through the NCP review process,
caused major changes to the mitigation efforts and environmental controls
used in constructing NT2.156 Although the protest did not prevent the dam’s
construction, it did change mitigation and compensation plans in a way
intended to benefit the people and the environment.157 Further evidence of
150

Id.
As of March 2006, the NT2 project in Laos is the only resolved NCP challenge that relates to predevelopment review based on the direct effects on indigenous peoples. For recent reports of NCP cases,
see OECD Watch, Home, http://www.oecdwatch.org/content.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). A June,
2005 challenge to a Brazilian hydroelectric dam, while possibly affecting local indigenous people, is based
on challenges to the financial structure of the development. See OECD Watch, OEDC Watch Newsletter 7
(Mar. 2006), http://www.oecdwatch.org/docs/OW_news_March_06_Eng.pdf; OECD Watch, News,
http://www.oecdwatch.org/416.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
152
Galit A. Sarfaty, The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous Rights Norms, 114 YALE
L.J. 1791, 1793 (2005) (arguing that World Bank standards are “a minimum floor that any environmentally
and socially sensitive project should meet.”) (citing Press Release, Friends of the Earth et al., Memorandum
on Camisea Project Violations of World Bank Safeguard Policies (Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.bicusa.org/
bicusa/issues/ misc_resources/338.php).
153
See Nam Theun 2 Power, http://www.namtheun2.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2006); WORLD BANK,
Proposed Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in Lao: PDR World Bank Responses to IRN-ED Technical
Reviews (Mar. 21, 2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAOPRD/Resources/IRN-EDF-ReviewResponse-March-21.pdf.
154
Id.
155
Id. Development studies had already been released to the World Bank and to the public by
November 23, 2004, when the NGOs sent their initial complaint. See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97. The
additional agreement on social responsibility EDF signed is dated January 24, 2005.
See
Recommendations, supra note 142. Although it is impossible to know if the complaint alone initiated this
additional commitment to social responsibility, a decision to do so at this time indicates sensitivity to the
issues.
156
The former president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, acknowledged that challenges to the
plans for Nam Theun II resulted in improved provisions for people in the region and more care taken to
protect wildlife and biodiversity. For audio of the interview, see NPR Interview, supra note 112.
157
Id.
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the influence of NCP review is provided by EDF’s first-ever partnership
with an NGO, CARE France,158 in 2005.159 According to EDF, this
partnership will contribute to EDF’s sustainable development policy,
particularly as it concerns the effect on populations local to the NT2
project.160
The NCP review process provided the indigenous people affected by
NT2, as represented by NGOs, the ability to express their concerns in a
meaningful way and compel the developer of the dam to respond. It is
unlikely these challenges would have been raised in the absence of the NCP
review process, which provided the affected people with a forum for voicing
their concerns.
B.

The Continued Peace of the People Affected by Nam Theun II
Development Shows the Effectiveness of NCP Review as a Partial
Solution to the Silence of Indigenous Peoples

The Hmong, one of the indigenous peoples who will be displaced by
NT2,161 have a long history of rebellion in Laos.162 During the French
colonial period, French insensitivity to Hmong interests, “especially their
failure to appreciate the devastating effect of tax increases on the already
low Hmong standard of living, periodically incited large numbers of Laotian
Hmong to armed rebellion.”163 Until the late 1940s, Hmong were treated as
second-class citizens by the ethnic Lao, forced to literally grovel before Lao
officials, charged higher prices, and paid lower wages than Lao people.164
This led to a series of rebellions that were eventually subsumed in the
Communist uprising.165
Given this history, the involuntary resettlement necessary to build
NT2 could be expected to face fierce local resistance. Although involuntary
resettlement of the Hmong has not begun in earnest,166 the current lack of
158

CARE works internationally with poor communities to supply a sustainable response to poverty.
See, e.g., CARE, Home, http://www.care.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2006); Press Release, CARE, EDF
Group Signs a Partnership with CARE France (May 2005), http://www.edf.com/55468d/Homecom/
Whoweare/Commitments/FichiersEN/PDFCAREEN [Hereinafter CARE Press Release].
159
See CARE Press Release, supra note 158.
160
See id.
161
See SEMFOP-1, supra note 115, at 6.
162
See KEITH QUINCY, HMONG: HISTORY OF A PEOPLE 115-116 (1988).
163
See id. at 116.
164
See id. at 140-141.
165
See id. at 140-156.
166
See Nam Theun 2 Power, supra note 153. A later report indicates that the first group of villagers
are to be relocated in the second half of 2006, with all resettlement completed by September of 2007. See
Nam Theun 2, Semi-Annual Progress Report: Period July to December 2005, Document No. NTPC
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substantial disputes is promising.167 Preliminary construction began in
2004,168 and the Nam Theun River was diverted in March 2006.169 Peaceful
development in traditionally held Hmong lands indicates that something in
this development process is being done right. Admittedly, disputes could
arise in the future, particularly as resettlement begins in earnest or if
significant problems with compensation arise. Significant steps, however,
have been taken to preempt such problems.
An indigenous group without peaceful, legal alternatives to change an
impending situation may turn to what seems like the only option—protest.170
Regardless of its initial form, protest holds an inherent risk of escalation to
violence.171 In a regime where government protest is outlawed, even
peaceful protest, in the form of rallies, sit-ins, or non-payment of taxes, may
be perceived as a threat to the government and may not remain peaceful for
long.172 For certain groups, like the Lao Hmong, with a long history of
armed rebellion, protest may lead to violence.173 Even traditionally peaceful
people, such as the Bougainville islanders of PNG, may resort to aggression
when they feel they have no alternatives.174
C.

Reconsidering the Disaster of Bougainville and Envisioning the
Future of the NCP Process

Specific problems in the process of developing Bougainville’s
Panguna mine, exacerbated by failed or non-existent environmental controls,
led to environmental degradation, rebellion, and civil war. During the
development process, the indigenous people were treated as “ignorant
savages, incapable of participating in a discussion to reach a consensus on a
B091802000001A, 37 (Jan. 15, 2005), http://www.namtheun2.com/gallery/lib_anreport/NTPC-%20-B091802-000001-A.pdf [hereinafter Progress Report].
167
No protests or uprisings have been reported. Four complaints have been made to the grievance
offices organized to allow villagers affected by construction to express concerns and requests. These
complaints include damage to a fish pond and roofs, that have now been repaired, and revisions have been
made to the procedures that caused the initial damage. Another complaint arose over compensation issues
during preliminary resettlement, but this has also been resolved. A request made about road conditions is
under consideration. See Progress Report, supra note 166 at 45.
168
Id. at 2.
169
See Laos News Agency, Nam Theun River Successfully Diverted, VIENTAINE TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2006 .
170
See generally CHOUDRY, supra note 3.
171
One of the earliest protests on Bougainville, in 1969, was the formation of a human chain across
land to be surveyed and bulldozed for a port. Rio Tinto responded to this peaceful protest with violence.
See Havini, supra note 7, at 68-69.
172
See JONATHAN A. FOX & L. DAVID BROWN, THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD
BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 16 (1998).
173
See QUINCY, supra note 162, at 115-116.
174
See Havini & Havini, supra note 7.
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resolution which would be beneficial to all parties.”175 According to project
plans, only a minimal amount of the profit from the mine was to be invested
in Bougainville’s infrastructure development, despite the direct and
substantial effects on local inhabitants.176
Environmental devastation, land loss, and social unrest led to
indigenous demands for environmental cleanup and local profit
investment.177 Francis Ona, the leader of the Panguna Landowners
Association,178 attempted to deal with the mine by demanding ten billion
kina179 from Rio Tinto to compensate for environmental damage caused by
development.180 Ona also demanded a fifty-percent share in the mine’s
profits, consultation on all new projects, and localization of ownership
within five years.181 When mine authorities refused to listen, Ona formed
the BRA, and began a guerrilla assault on mine facilities and personnel.
1.

Rio Tinto and the PNG Government Failed to Protect the Environment
or to Consult the Indigenous People Affected by the Mine, Leading to
the Disaster for Bougainville

Two primary causes of the Bougainville rebellion include the colonial
government’s lack of consultation about the mine with the indigenous
people, and the environmental damage the mine caused.182 The mining
agreement created by the Australian government “left no room for
discussion and consultation, and the PNG government likewise refused to
engage in consultation and consensus building”183 with the native people.
Although the concessions Ona demanded from Rio Tinto before
beginning his guerrilla campaign to close the mine were deliberately
exaggerated to ensure that they would be dismissed, thus justifying future
violence,184 the essential elements of his demands were reasonable: money
to fix environmental damage caused by the mine, local investment of mine
profits, and localized ownership.
175

See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25.
Id. at 26.
177
Id. at 36.
178
The Panguna Landowners Association was an association of native landholders allied with the
Bougainville government and founded to raise issues related to mine finance and pollution. It later
developed into a insurrectionary organization with a policy of arson and violence toward mining personnel.
Id. at 28.
179
This is approximately equivalent to U.S.$10 billion. Alley, supra note 7, at 230.
180
See id.; see also HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 36.
181
Alley, supra note 7, at 230.
182
HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 28.
183
Id. at 1.
184
Alley, supra note 7, at 230.
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The NCP Review Process Would Have Provided a Way for the
Indigenous People to Have Their Complaints Heard, Ideally Before
Development Began

Using the NCP review process would have allowed the indigenous
people of Bougainville to bring a specific instance before the National
Contact Point of either Australia or the United Kingdom.185 Rio Tinto is a
corporation based in Australia and the United Kingdom,186 both OCED
members.187 NCP review would have given the indigenous people of
Bougainville a way to have their concerns heard by a disinterested third
party, either before development began, or at any point during construction
or operation.
The primary information necessary to challenge project adequacy is
the information provided by the developer for investors, or provided to
comply with public disclosure requirements. Not only does this provide
information for review, it also ensures that the developer has a complete
mitigation plan prior to the start of development. The affected indigenous
people allege Rio Tinto took no environmental precautions in building or
running the Panguna mine and made no environmental or cultural
assessments before construction began, despite promising to protect the
environment.188
Mitigation information available during Panguna
development may not compare to the exhaustive documentation for NT2, but
the Guidelines provide that Multinationals should “ensure that timely,
regular, reliable, and relevant information is disclosed regarding their
activities, structure, financial situation, and performance.”189 Reporting
185
The current NCP review process only became available in 2000, long after the Panguna mine was
constructed and its unfortunate consequences felt. This analysis is only meant to illustrate the effectiveness
of the NCP review process, and is not a criticism of the people of Bougainville.
186
The Rio Tinto Group (Rio Tinto) is composed of Rio Tinto PLC, a British and Wales corporation,
and Rio Tinto Limited, an Australian corporation. The Rio Tinto Group owns and operates subsidiaries
worldwide as holding companies. The present day Rio Tinto emerged from the 1995 union of RTZ
Corporation plc and Conzinc Riotinto of Australia into RTZ/CRA, which later changed its name to Rio
Tinto. Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) is a PNG corporation, 53.6% owned by Rio Tinto in 2000.
The Panguna mine was developed by Conzinc Rio Tinto, and at the time of mine construction and
management, Rio Tinto held a higher percentage of stock and exercised complete control of BCL, with
London executives controlling all major mine decisions. See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 8-10;
Rio Tinto, About the Company: History, http://www.riotinto.com/aboutus/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 14,
2006).
187
See OECD Home, supra note 35.
188
See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 2-3. Plaintiffs also allege that Rio Tinto has a “long
history of wanton disregard for the environment and local populations,” including violations of
environmental regulations in Australia, the United Kingdom, India, Namibia, and South Africa. Rio Tinto
also has been the subject of United Nations resolutions, a UN sponsored court case, and numerous
demonstrations in Western Europe. Id. at 27-31.
189
GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.III.1.
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should include environmental and social reporting190 and systems of
managing risk.191 This information would have provided the people of
Bougainville information on which to base their complaint.
The OECD Guidelines contain numerous provisions under which the
indigenous people could have raised challenges, many falling within the
chapter on environment.192 One specific problem that could have been
addressed by NCP review is inadequate compensation for land seizures.
Native and Australian colonial concepts of property at the time of the mine
land grants were vastly different.193 Under the Australian standard applied,
all land below the surface belonged to the State, a concept of land rights that
greatly benefited the colonial administration.194 Traditional indigenous
conceptions of land were all-encompassing.195 In the words of the
indigenous people, land is:
our physical life; it is marriage; it is status; it is security; it is
politics; in fact, it is our only world … We have little or no
experience of social survival detached from the land. For us to
be completely landless is a nightmare for which no dollar in the
pocket or dollar in the bank will allay.196
This statement indicates that cash compensation for land, no matter how
financially generous, would be inadequate mitigation for tearing up the
structure of social life. OECD Guidelines Part 1.II states that “[e]nterprises
should take fully into account established policies in the countries in which
they operate, and consider the views of other stakeholders.” 197 Although the
use of “should” eliminates any force from this provision, it does lay out an
obligation to consider established policies, and to consider stakeholder
views, a category the landless villagers fall into.
190

Id. pt. 1.III.2.
Id. pt. 1.III.5.b.
Id. pt. 1.V.
193
See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25; Alley, supra note 7, at 227.
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Granting underground land rights to Rio Tinto led to the government partnership and profit
sharing. See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25.
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See Alley, supra note 7, at 227.
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Id.
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Stakeholders, under the Guidelines, include the local community, business interests, employees,
customers, suppliers, contractors, and the public-at-large. See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pts. 3.3, 3.35.
Stakeholders may also include creditors, investors, and the representative bodies of employees. See OECD
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Principle IV, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) Doc. SG/CG(99)5 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/
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a company. See Petros Vellas, International Project Finance: Social Accountability of Project Companies
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This loose language allows the “established policies” of the
indigenous people to be considered equally with the “established policies” of
the Australian government. Although Australia’s policy at the time of the
Bougainville disaster did not allow indigenous control over underlying land,
the indigenous people themselves have established policies, or customs, that
made land ownership the fundamental basis for social interaction. Because
neither the Australian nor the indigenous practice is necessarily more valid
under the Guidelines, indigenous customs could be considered equally in the
course of land seizure. Mitigation measures, in order to be adequate, could
consider the value of land that extends beyond money, perhaps by providing
alternative acceptable land rather than cash.
The notion that native custom should be considered equally with
colonial practice is supported by the PNG Constitution. At the time of PNG
independence, the PNG constitution adopted custom as part of the
underlying law, along with the principles and rules of common law and
equity.198 Embracing custom rather than looking merely to colonial legal
traditions acknowledges the continuing value of local tradition in
establishing national law.199 Although this Constitution did not yet exist
when construction began on the Panguna mine, its adoption corroborates the
idea that indigenous custom should be evaluated on equal terms with
colonial rule when an enterprise “take[s] fully into account established
policies in the countries in which [it] operate[s], and consider[s] the views of
other stakeholders.”200
“Consider” is another weakly worded requirement. The provision,
however, is enough to provide a basis for NCP review. This opens the door
to third-party evaluation of the project and its effects, and may even lead to
discussion and settlement between the parties, a far better outcome than
violence, civil war, and destruction.
Because the NCP has no enforcement power, it has no power to police
actors.201 Given its limitations, what makes NCP review most effective is
that it provides a way to prevent development until adequate mitigation
measures exist. NCP review could have recognized and taken into account
198
See PAPUA N.G. CONST. scheds. 2.1, 2.2; Alyssa A. Vegter, Comment, Forsaking the Forests for
the Trees: Forestry Law in Papua New Guinea Inhibits Indigenous Customary Ownership, 14 PAC. RIM L.
& POL'Y J. 545, 556 (2005).
199
Adopting custom also recognizes the wide range of custom brought by the many indigenous
populations of PNG, limiting the use of custom only if it is inconsistent with constitutional law, statute, or
is “repugnant to the general principles of humanity.” Papua N.G. Const. sched. 2.1(2). Thus, the customs
of customary ownership or property laws that have developed in various regions, as seen in local land
courts. See Vegter, supra note 198, at 564-565.
200
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201
See id. pt. 1.I.1.
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indigenous customs in Bougainville. Rather than being treated as ignorant
savages, incapable of discussion, the indigenous people could have been
treated with respect, and their concerns heard. Simply being allowed to
participate could have done a great deal to prevent the rebellion and civil
war.
Furthermore, participation in the process would likely have some
influence on Rio Tinto. Rio Tinto might not have treated the indigenous
people as “ignorant savages” once they were known to be capable of
participating in a complex international dispute resolution process. NCP
review would also have provided incentive for restraint by bringing Rio
Tinto’s actions to public attention.
NCP review is not perfect. Even if specific instances were raised
against Rio Tinto, government actions would escape review.202 The
government could not have been forced to use any of the profits for
developing infrastructure on Bougainville, nor would it have prevented the
government from calling in the army to protect the mine or restore peace.
Arguably, however, and according to allegations, both the Australian and the
PNG governments were lured into agreements and actions that hurt
Bougainville’s indigenous people because of pressure from Rio Tinto,
primarily through fear of financial consequences.203 Without the pressure
exerted by Rio Tinto, the governments would not have acted as they did. If
Bougainville’s indigenous people had been able to obtain NCP review before
development of the mine began, that pressure might not have been placed on
the governments.
By providing a forum for review in which indigenous people could
have expressed their concerns about development, the disastrous
consequences of the Panguna development could have been avoided.
Development can be designed to minimize the negative effects on people
and land; NCP review provides a way for affected indigenous people to
influence that design.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The process provided by NCP review can and should be used to the
benefit of indigenous people in the development context. Several attributes
202
NCP review does not extend to the actions of sovereign states, although it does cover state-owned
multinationals. Id. pt. 1.I.3.
203
See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 1, 23, 26, 43. One specific alleged instance of financial
intimidation by Rio Tinto was when Rio Tinto threatened to pull out of the Panguna mine along with all
other planned investment in PNG unless the government managed to reopen the Panguna mine through the
use of military force. Id. at 43.
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of the NCP review process make it ideal for indigenous people. The process
allows third-party disinterested review of development projects before
development actually begins and cannot be undone. The process requires a
response from the Multinational involved in the process, while indigenous
concerns expressed without the process could simply be ignored by the
Multinational. As soft law, the Guidelines retain the flexibility to address
problems across borders and between disparate groups.
NCP review helps prevent problems caused by the international nature
of Multinationals. An affected group is not limited to the courts of its own
country, or to international fora. A group can circumvent inadequate or
unfair processes in its own country and use NCP review in Multinational’s
home country. There, too, the Multinational has less chance of avoiding
challenges brought against it.
As shown in the NT2 development in Laos and in the reconsideration
of the Bougainville disaster in Papua New Guinea, NCP review can be
applied to development disputes throughout the Pacific Rim. Review is not
limited to indigenous peoples; it can be used to create an additional level of
review by any group affected by development. Two sides exist in every
development project, and there is often an imbalance of power between
them. NCP review can help level the playing field, regardless of the
resources of the players.
NCP review cannot solve all the problems inherent in international
development. It can, however, provide an opportunity for indigenous
peoples affected by development to express their concerns about
development and mitigation, to receive a response to those concerns, and to
receive an impartial evaluation of future plans. When a developer originates
from an adhering country, indigenous peoples should use this tool to
improve plans, mitigation, and project review.

